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Introduction
The interconnection between migration, 
ethnicity and politics has been thoroughly 
studied, among others, by Fearon and Laitin 
(2011). In the case of Indonesia, the recent 
study by Barter and Cote (2015) clearly shows 
that local political conflicts closely related 
with the increasing number of migrants are 
perceived by the locals as a threat to their 
livelihoods. As the capital city of the world’s 
fourth largest population country, Jakarta, 
like many other big cities in the developing 
economies, for example, Mexico City or New 
Delhi; hosts migrants from all the regions of 
the country. The arrival of migrants to Jakarta 
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Abstract
As the capital city of a country with the world’s fourth largest population, Jakarta, like many other 
big cities in the developing economies, for example, Mexico City or New Delhi, hosts migrants 
from all regions of the country. Without a doubt, Jakarta has increasingly become the major 
core of the agglomeration processes transforming it and its satellite cities into a Mega Urban 
Region (MUR). This paper traces historically the interactions between migration, ethnicities 
and local politics in Jakarta from the 1960s to the 2000s focusing on the latest development, in 
which the phenomenon ‘Ahok’, the nickname of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Chinese-Christian 
from the small district of Belitung, has become an increasingly popular Governor of Jakarta. The 
paper argues that through the recent developments in Jakarta the politics have apparently been 
transformed into more civic, rather than ethnic politics. The nature of Jakarta as a proliferating 
migrant city transcends narrow cultural identities as well as conventional party politics into a 
more active citizenry through the widespread use of social media. 
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had already started in the 17th century. 
Because of the low number of inhabitants, 
the Government of the Dutch East Indies 
encouraged people to move to Batavia1 to 
meet its labour needs. The migrants were not 
only from Java’s hinterland (such as Javanese 
and Sundanese ethnic groups) or outside of 
Java (such as Balinese, Bugis, Batak and 
Ambonese), but also from the Far East (such 
as Japanese and Chinese people) and South 
Asia (such as Arabs and Indians) (Castles, 
1967 and Abeyasekere, 1987). Those ethnic 
groups then merged into what was called 
1  Batavia was the name of the Dutch East Indies’ capital 
city. At that time, it became the center of the Dutch East 
Indies trading network in Asia, including black pepper, 
cloves and cinnamon. Now the area corresponds to the 
city of Jakarta.
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Batavian or Betawi or Djakarta Asli (Castles, 
1967). With Jakarta as the capital, the number 
of migrants has increased significantly since 
the Independence of Indonesia in 1945. 
Without a doubt, Jakarta has developed as the 
major core of the agglomeration processes 
transforming the city and its satellite cities into 
a Mega Urban Region (MUR).2 The migrants 
disperse to the satellite cities, therefore, the 
number in Jakarta has decreased since the 
mid1990s. However, Jakarta has the most 
diverse ethnic mix in Indonesia with 9,607,787 
inhabitants (Population Census of Indonesia, 
2010).
In September 2012, surprisingly Jokowi 
(Joko Widodo) and his running mate Ahok 
(Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) won victory in 
Jakarta’s 2012 Gubernatorial Elections. With 
54% of votes, these candidates successfully 
beat the incumbent, Foke (Fauzi Bowo) and 
Nara (Nachrowi Ramli) who are both native 
2  In this article, we consider Jakarta as a city. In fact, we 
should note that administratively since the 1950s Jakarta 
has been governed not as a city, but as a province called 
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta or the Special Capital 
Territory of Jakarta, comprising five cities and one district 
(Bunnell & Miller, 2012). Furthermore, since the 1970s 
during the centralized New Order regime emphasizing 
economic growth, Jakarta has been developed into 
a MUR called Jabodetabekjur incorporating Bogor, 
Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi and Cianjur (Firman, 2008 
and 2009; Windarsih and Hadi, 2014).
Betawi Muslims. Since the end of the New 
Order regime in 1998, the decentralization 
governance system has provided greater 
‘power’ for both the regional governments 
and the people to manage their city or region, 
including by participating in direct regional 
elections. In fact, local politicians in many 
areas are mostly reliant on the support of 
religious leaders considered able to get 
large numbers of votes (Kloos & Berenschot, 
2016). This certainly put a heavy burden on 
Jokowi, a Muslim Javanese from Solo and 
Ahok, a Christian Chinese-Indonesian from 
the small district of Belitung, who both are 
migrants to Jakarta. Despite negative ethno-
religious campaigns against them, Miichi 
(2014) describes their victory as a triumph of 
democracy, particularly for the Jakartans. 
In 2014, since Jokowi was elected 
president in October, Ahok was inaugurated as 
Jakarta’s new governor in November, amidst 
protests from the supporters of the losing 
presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto, 
and hard-line Islamic groups. In his early days 
as the Governor of Jakarta, Ahok experienced 
opposition from the House of Representatives 
in terms of contravening the gubernatorial 
appointment rules as well as budget 
transparency. Ahok pays great attention to 
managing the governance system, including 
Source: http://www.inspired-bali.com/wp1/50-years-in-indonesia/, in which the grey colour, the 
red dot and the insert of Jakarta are modified by the authors
Picture 1 Map of Indonesia with Jakarta Insert
25
MIGRATION, ETHNICITY AND LOCAL POLITICS: 
THE CASE OF JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Populasi Volume 24 Nomor 2 2016
planning the dismissal of underachieving 
civil servants and introducing e-budgeting 
for transparency, as well as asking property 
owners to pay fines enabling him to conduct 
various projects in a short period of time. 
Therefore, with the bureaucracy of Jakarta 
becoming much less cumbersome, Ahok 
is gaining popularity among the Jakartans 
despite his harsh attitudes. Banking on this 
popularity, Ahok is certain to run in the next 
Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections in 2017.
This article discusses the changing role 
of ethnicity in Jakartans’ public life as well 
as its consequences to the local politics. To 
some extent the democracy of Indonesia 
might be a paradox between freer and fairer 
public space and patronage democracy 
(Berenschot, Nordholt & Bakker, 2016). As 
highlighted by Berenschot, Nordholt and 
Bakker (2016), a weakly institutionalized state 
and mediated access to the state in most of 
the postcolonial states, including Indonesia, 
encourage client centered and often identity-
based relationships with politicians and other 
power holders. Therefore organizations, such 
as ethnic or faith based ones, can be useful 
lubricants for the client centered exchanges. 
However, we argue that the recent political 
developments in Jakarta have apparently 
been transformed into more civic rather than 
ethnic politics. The nature of Jakarta as a 
proliferating migrant city transcends narrow 
cultural identities as well as conventional party 
politics into a more active citizenry through 
the widespread use of social media. In the 
heat of Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election, 
for the first time in history, the front-runner is a 
Christian Chinese-Indonesian. Since Jakarta 
is the center of national politics, this new 
kind of local politics will exemplify substantial 
democracy for other cities in Indonesia. 
The aim of this article is to comprehend 
the ways migration and ethnic diversity have 
transformed Jakarta as a city of migrants 
and the consequences to the local politics. 
We start by providing some historical context 
to interpret the nature of Jakarta as a host 
city of migrants from various ethnic groups. 
Then, we draw the dynamics of ethnicity and 
provincial leadership in Jakarta from 1945 to 
the present. In the third part, we describe the 
recent Jakarta local politics with an emphasis 
on Ahok and his political manoeuvers, 
including the establishment of ‘Teman Ahok’ 
(Friend{s} of Ahok) as the social media political 
campaign platform. Later, we discuss the 
political contestation for the upcoming Jakarta 
Gubernatorial Elections. The conclusion 
highlights to what extend the civic politics is 
likely to work in Jakarta.
Ethnic Composition of Jakarta
Since its establishment in 1619 by Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen, Jakarta has become a very 
attractive city (Abeyasekere, 1987). At that 
time, the economic activities of Jakarta were 
extensive and included farming, plantations, 
the sugarcane industry as well as brick and roof 
tile production (Kanumoyoso, 2007) attracting 
people to move to Jakarta because of the 
numerous job opportunities. As mentioned, 
these migrants were from Java’s hinterland 
and various parts of the Archipelago, as 
well as from East and South Asia. According 
to Kanumoyoso (2007), the ethnic identity 
of migrants in Batavia was getting blurred 
because of (a) socio-economic interests and 
geographical proximity, (b) intermarriage 
among various ethnic groups, (c) common 
experiences in the military service of the 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 
(d) religious identity, and (e) slavery institutions 
enabling migrants to work in a multi-ethnic 
environment. The presence of various ethnic 
groups created Batavia and then Jakarta as a 
multi-ethnic city. 
Since the Independence of Indonesia in 
1945, the composition of the ethnic groups 
in Jakarta as a host city of migrants has 
changed tremendously. While previously, 
Jakarta welcomed migrants from Europe as 
well as East and South Asia, their number has 
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significantly decreased in the post-colonial 
period. In the period from 1945 onwards, the 
migrants to Jakarta have been from various 
ethnic groups in the Indonesian Archipelago. 
This was firstly shown in the data of the 1961 
Population Census when no ethnic group 
question was asked explicitly. However, within 
this, Castles (1967) made a calculation based 
on the birth place of migrants in Jakarta. He 
also assumed that everyone in Jakarta in 
1961 was either (a) a survivor or descendant 
of the 1930 population or (b) an immigrant 
since 1930 or a descendant of such an 
immigrant (pp. 154). From his calculation, 
the main ethnic groups forming Jakarta were 
Sundanese, Javanese, and Madurese, Betawi 




Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
Betawi 655,400 22.9 2,301,582 27.65 2,700,722 28.29
Sundanese 952,500 32.8 1,271,531 15.27 1,395,240 14.61
Javanese & Madurese 737,700 25.4 - - - -
Javanese - - 2,927,340 35.16 3,452,168 36.16
Madurese - - 47,055 0.57 79,925 0.84
Bantenese - - 20,582 0.25 - -
Acehnese 5,200 0.2 - - - -
Batak 28,900 1.0 300,562 3.61 326,645 3.42
Minangkabau 60,100 2.1 264,639 3.18 272,018 2.85
South Sumatran 34,900 1.2 - - - -
Palembangnese - - - - 63,333 0.66
Banjarnese 4,800 0.2 7,977 0.10 - -
South Sulawesianese 17,200 0.6 - - - -
Bugis - - 49,426 0.59 68,366 0.72
North Sulawesianese 21,000 0.7 - - - -
Mollucan & Irianese 11,800 0.4 - - - -
East Nusa 
Tenggaranese
4,800 0.2 - - - -
West Nusa 
Tenggaranese
1,300 0.0 - - - -
Balinese 1,900 0.1 - - - -
Malay and from other 
islands
19,800 0.7 134,477 1.62 111,125 1.16
Unknown 38,600 1.3 - - - -
Chinese 294,000 10.1 460,002 5.53 632,372 6.62
Others 16,500 0.6 539,529 6.48 445,627 4.67
Total 2,906,500 100.0 8,324,707 100.00 9,547,541 100.00
Source: Castles (1967: 185), Suryadinata, Arifin & Ananta (2003: 19), Ananta, Arifin, Hasbullah, 
Handayani & Pramono (2015: 106).
3   In his calculation, Castles (1967) distinguished non-indigenous people into two categories, namely (a) hybrid or 
citizenship replacement people and (b) foreigners. On his data, he calculates that there were around 102,000 Chi-
nese foreigners among 294,000 Chinese in Indonesia. He also adds that of the 16,500 from other ethnic groups in 
the 1961 Population Census, there were at least 10,200 foreigners.
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and Chinese consecutively as presented in 
Table 1. In 1971, 1980 and 1990 population 
censuses, the question of ethnicity was 
erased from the questionnaire due to the New 
Order Government perception that statistics 
on ethnicity could be divisive for national 
integration.
While data on ethnic groups was considered 
politically taboo by the New Order regime, 
this question is reinstated in the Population 
Census in the reformasi period. Indonesia 
consists of various ethnic groups and local 
languages; therefore, understanding those 
diversities is part of establishing Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika or Unity in Diversity in our nation. 
From Population Censuses in 2000 and 2010, 
we can observe that the four major ethnic 
groups in Jakarta remain Betawi, Sundanese, 
Javanese and Chinese followed by Batak, 
Minangkabau and Malay (Table 1). However, 
the number of Sundanese is decreasing if 
compared with the 1961 Population Census. 
This puts Sundanese only in the third rank 
following Javanese and Betawi. Meanwhile, 
the number of people of Chinese ethnicity 
consistently stays in the fourth place. The 
other sizable ethnic groups in recent Jakarta 
are Bugis, Madurese, Palembangnese, 
Bantenese and Banjarnese. We can observe 
some homogeneous areas with a big number of 
concentrated ethnic groups, such as Chinese 
in the Glodok and Mangga Dua areas, Bugis 
in the Tanjung Priok area and (previously) 
Betawi in the Condet area. In fact, Betawi 
at the present time mostly live dispersed in 
the fringe suburban areas around Jakarta in 
keeping with their socio-economic status. 
The trends of the 1961, 2000 and 2010 
Population Censuses show the contribution 
of migration to the ethnic composition of 
Jakarta. The presence of migrants in Jakarta 
emphasizing socio-economic relationships 
makes the ethnic identity vaguely create a 
multi-ethnic city. In recent days, Jakartans 
mostly prefer to speak Bahasa Indonesia 
in their own style rather than their mother 
languages and perceive themselves as the 
representatives of Indonesia.4 Castles (1967: 
153) even claimed Jakarta as the ‘melting pot’ 
for various ethnic groups as well as ‘the most-
even the only-Indonesian city’, where ‘God is 
making the Indonesians!’ Since the Jakartans 
are mostly cosmopolite migrants, we argue 
that civic rather than ethnic politics is getting 
popular among them as discussed in the 
following parts.
Ethnicity and the Provincial Leadership of 
Jakarta
The leadership of Jakarta is crucial for 
Indonesia as it is the capital city of the country. 
The political situation of Jakarta will always be 
a reference for other cities in Indonesia and 
a barometer for the national politics. Ethnic 
politics seem to have never been in favour 
for most Jakartans, particularly in the current 
democracy era. These are at least reflected 
in three political regimes of Indonesia, namely 
Old Order, New Order and reformasi. 
During the Old Order regime (1945-1965), 
Jakarta was mostly governed by national 
political figures. Soekarno as the first President 
of Indonesia, who was also a national 
leader for the Independence of Indonesia, 
4  “… Eeh Nok, lu pan jelek-jelek anak Jakarte, masa 
segala neken aje nggak becus? Malu-maluin gue aja lu 
ah!” kata bang Amat serenta cabut kartu penduduknya 
dari kantong atas, “Nih kaye gue, kalo ude punye pan 
enak!”… “Nama… Amat bin Conat,” untuk kesekian 
kalinya bang Amat membaca kartu penduduknya 
kencang-kencang, “Bangsa … Indonesia! Agama 
… Selam eh Islam!” (Muntaco, 2006: 251-252). [“… 
Nok, you are Jakartan. How can’t you make your own 
signature? That’s a shame,” bang Amat said to his wife 
while taking out the ID card from his pocket. “It’s nice 
when we’ve had it, just like me!” …. “Name … Amat bin 
Conat,” for the umpteenth time bang Amat read his ID 
card loudly, “Nation … Indonesia! Religion … Selam 
eh Islam!”]. This dialogue narrates the typical language 
spoken by the Jakartans combining Bahasa Betawi as 
the language of the “indigenous people” and Bahasa 
Indonesia. Not only multi-ethnic, but also the Jakartans 
perceive themselves as the centre of Indonesia, 
therefore, they need to be foremost in everything, such 
as being literate and active in civic participation as in the 
above story.
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encouraged the growth of nationalism for 
Indonesians, especially Jakartans. He not only 
built national projects, such as the National 
Monument in the centre of Merdeka Square, 
Central Jakarta, but also appointed national 
political figures as mayors of Jakarta. Only 
two out of the six mayors of Jakarta in this 
period were non-Javanese. They were Daan 
Jahja, from Padang and Henk Ngantung, 
from the Minahasa ethnic group. Rather 
than ethnicity, most of these mayors were 
appointed because of their political affiliation 
and credibility. The mayors of Jakarta during 
the Old Order regime were affiliated with the 
winning parties in national elections, both 
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (Indonesian 
National Party) led by Soekarno and Partai 
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) 
(Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) 
incorporating Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah as the two biggest Islamic 
mass organizations in Indonesia. 
All governors of Jakarta in the New Order 
regime (1965-1998) were from the military, 
which reflects the authoritarian character of 
the New Order regime. Under the leadership 
of President Suharto, the second president, 
who led Indonesia for 32 years, the governors 
of Jakarta were only those having proximity 
as well as following his rules. The most 
popular governor in this time was Ali Sadikin, 
the only non-Javanese. This Sundanese was 
the longest serving governor of Jakarta, from 
Table 2 Governors of Jakarta: 1945-Present5
No. Name Year Ethnic Group Affiliation
1. Soewirjo 1945-1947 Javanese Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)
2. Daan Jahja 1948-1950 Padang Military
3. Soewirjo 1950-1951 Javanese Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)
4. Sjamsuridjal 1951-1953 Javanese Masyumi








9. Ali Sadikin 1966-1977 Sundanese Military
10. Tjokropranolo 1977-1982 Javanese Military




13. Soerjadi Soedirdja 1992-1997 Javanese Military
14. Sutiyoso 1997-2007 Javanese Military
15. Fauzi Bowo 2007-2012 Betawi Partai Demokrat
16. Joko Widodo 2012-2014 Javanese Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (PDI-P)





Source: Compiled by the authors, based on the data provided by Panitia Penulisan Gubernur 
Jakarta, 2011.
5 Jakarta was firstly governed as a city in the period of 1945-1960 by the Mayor Soewirjo, Mayor Daan Jahja, 
Mayor Sjamsuridjal and Mayor Soediro. Since then, Jakarta has been governed as a province.
29
MIGRATION, ETHNICITY AND LOCAL POLITICS: 
THE CASE OF JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Populasi Volume 24 Nomor 2 2016
1966 to 1977. He is considered a modernist, 
who transformed Jakarta into a modern city 
through various programs, such as improving 
public services, banning becak (cycle 
rickshaw), clearing out the slum dwellers, 
kampungisasi, encouraging urban dwellers 
to reinvest in the traditional value of gotong 
royong (mutual cooperation) with modern 
ones, creating Jakarta Fair -a month long 
peoples’ bazaar (continued until now) as well 
as building mega projects, such as Taman 
Ismail Marzuki, Ragunan Zoo and the Ancol 
Amusement Park. Although Jakarta had one of 
its greatest governors in this period, the strong 
power of the New Order regime through their 
military governors reproduced the ‘patron-
client relationship’ in Jakarta rooted to other 
cities in Indonesia. The relationships between 
the patron or the collusion between politicians, 
bureaucrats and business dominated the 
networks and distributed large sums of money 
in exchange for loyalty from the clients or what 
is called by Berenschot, Nordholt & Bakker 
(2016) ‘clientilistic exchange relations.’
Democracy is the strongest attribute of 
reformasi (1998-present). In this regime, 
Indonesians insist on the decentralization of 
government. Based on Law No. 32 Year 2004 
on Regional Autonomy, the citizens have the 
right to manage their own regional government 
as well as voting for their regional leader 
directly. While in the beginning of reformasi 
Jakarta was still governed by Sutiyoso for 
ten years, afterwards the Jakartans voted 
for their governor directly. At the first Jakarta 
Gubernatorial Election, it was Fauzi Bowo, a 
native Betawi Muslim, who gained the majority 
of votes. Rather than ethnicity reasons, we 
assume his victory was a form of proximity 
and affiliation with the ruling regime, President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is also the 
chairman of Partai Demokrat (Democratic 
Party). In the context of democracy, the 
dynamics of Jakarta’s local politics have 
heated up since Jakarta’s 2012 Gubernatorial 
Elections bringing ‘a new hope to politics’. 
Jokowi’s victory is evidence of populism 
politics in Jakarta. As highlighted by Hamid 
(2014), the four factors enabling the rise of 
Jokowi’s popularity are (1) social breakdown 
and declining capability of the government; 
(2) corruption, draining political traditions and 
the negative image of political parties; (3) 
societal changes; and (4) the emergences 
of forms of political representation outside of 
traditional political institutions. As Jokowi was 
voted in to be the President of Indonesia in 
the 2014 Presidential Elections, Ahok was 
appointed as Jakarta’s Governor in the same 
year. Following his predecessor Jokowi, 
Ahok has continuously reformed the city 
governance making him the most popular, yet 
controversial Governor of Jakarta as will be 
discussed in the next part. 
Jakarta’s Recent Local Politics: Ahok and 
His Political Manoeuvers 
As widely reported, in 2016 Ahok was 
the most searched person on Google in 
Indonesia. This Christian Chinese-Indonesian 
Governor of Jakarta has not only been 
popular among his adherents, but also with 
the opposition since he has led the city from 
November 2014. His popularity seems to 
result from his ‘double-minority status’ as well 
as his blunt communications style. Firstly, 
Ahok is a Chinese-Indonesian migrant from 
Manggar, East Belitung, who first moved to 
Jakarta to study for his senior high school 
accreditation then his bachelor degree at the 
end of the 1980s. Although the Chinese ethnic 
group stays in the fourth place of Jakarta’s 
ethnic composition, this ethnic group remains 
politically discriminated against. Secondly, 
he is a Christian in Muslim-majority Jakarta. 
Furthermore, Ahok frequently criticizes and 
scolds not only his subordinates of assorted 
wrongdoing, but also expresses his stance, 
particularly any disagreement, directly to the 
public in general.
Ahok started his political career since 
reformasi. At first he was affiliated with a new 
party: Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru 
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(PPIB) and became a member of the Regional 
Legislative Council of East Belitung District 
for 2004-2009. Only seven months later, he 
gained huge support to run for regent of the 
same district. He won with 37.13% votes in 
the politically based area of Masyumi and 
became the Regent of East Belitung for 2005-
2010. In 2009, he was elected as the Member 
of the House of Representatives in Jakarta, 
representing Golongan Karya (Golkar). 
He then resigned to be the running mate 
of Jokowi in Jakarta’s 2012 Gubernatorial 
Elections as a member of Gerakan Indonesia 
Raya (Gerindra). When his predecessor, 
Jokowi, was elected President of Indonesia, 
Ahok resigned from Gerindra in September 
2014 or before his inauguration as governor; 
therefore, he acts as a politically independent 
governor of Jakarta. This political manoeuvre 
enabled him to separate himself from the 
oligarchic powerful national elites in the 
political parties. He can carry out a lot of 
development projects relatively quickly by 
asking, mostly property owners, to pay ‘fines’, 
for such as the Semanggi interchange as well 
as Northern Jakarta’s coast reclamation. 
Implementing budget transparency was 
the second manoeuver of Ahok. In the 
beginning of 2015, the use of e-budgeting, 
namely kawalapbd.org, allowed Ahok to find 
an irregularity or misuse in Jakarta’s regional 
budget, which cost the nation around Rp12 
trillion (Pradita, 2015). Ahok became entangled 
Picture 2 A Peaceful Rally to Support Ahok against the City Councils 
Table 3 Online Activities of Teman Ahok
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on the data provided on social media accounts of 
Teman Ahok.
Source: www.thejakartapost.com
No. New Media Followers
1. Website temanahok.com -
2. Twitter @temanAhok 97,330 followers; 22,325 tweets
3. Facebook page @temanahok 400,203 likes
4. Youtube Teman Ahok 17,489 subscribers; 2,969,996 views
5. Instragram temanahokofficial 154,000 followers
31
MIGRATION, ETHNICITY AND LOCAL POLITICS: 
THE CASE OF JAKARTA, INDONESIA
Populasi Volume 24 Nomor 2 2016
in argument with the City Councils receiving 
many attacks from the elites, including that 
involving the case of land acquisition in West 
Jakarta from the Sumber Waras Hospital by 
the city administration (The Jakarta Post, 14 
June 2016), at the same time people came 
up with various social media hashtags and 
movements supporting him (Dwifatma, 2015). 
Rather than shrinking, Ahok is perceived 
as ‘clean’; an honest, strong leader fighting 
corruption, therefore, his popularity has 
soared rapidly.
Ahok’s third manoeuver was announcing 
his plan to join the Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial 
Elections through an independent path 
distanced from political parties. This certainly 
creates empathy among his adherents who 
endorse his position with no political party 
affiliations. First, during the Car Free Day at the 
Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Central Jakarta, 
on 1 March 2015, a group of people wore masks 
of Ahok to support him over the draft 2015 city 
budget (Picture 2). This was the inception of 
Teman Ahok (Friend{s} of Ahok) movement 
established on 16 June 2015, by five young 
people, namely Aditya Yogi Prabowo, Richard 
Saerang, Singgih Widiyastono, Amalia 
Ayuningtyas and Muhammad Fathony.6 The 
main activity of this movement was primarily 
to collect Jakartans’ ID cards as a way of 
supporting Ahok’s independent candidacy in 
the next gubernatorial elections, when at least 
750,000 ID cards are needed. Initiated by 
the young, Teman Ahok combines traditional 
media (including posts, booths, hotlines and 
gatherings) and new media (including website 
temanahok.com, Twitter, Facebook, Youtube 
and Instagram) on their movement (Table 3). 
New media is the first tool for Teman Ahok to 
attract public engagement. The website is used 
6  This movement firstly received assistance from 
political consultancy institutions, particularly the CEO 
of the Cyrus Network, Hasan Nasbi, who works in 
collaboration with Sunny Tanuwidjaja, an unpaid political 
staffer for Ahok. Hasan trained them in campaign 
strategy, provided a building as a post and gave Rp500 
million for initial preparations (Purnomo, Aprianto & 
Ernis 2016). Later, they started to sell merchandise to 
finance their movement.
to provide information about Ahok, including 
personals, performances and achievements. It 
also counts down the total update of collected 
Jakartan ID cards. Meanwhile, the massive 
use of the social media is effective to gain the 
public’s attentions; mostly of the young and 
the middle class. They then interconnect the 
online and the offline spaces through posts, 
booths built in several malls, such as Mall 
Kelapa Gading and Kuningan City, as well 
as other public gathering places. This can be 
categorized as digital activism that is internet 
supported with a low threshold (Van Laer and 
Van Aelst, 2010). The internet or new media 
only supports the movement. The public is 
required to participate directly by handing over 
their ID cards and giving signatures as support 
agreements. This certainly has lower risks for 
most participants. Starting on 15 June 2015, 
they eventually were able to collect 1 million 
vote pledges a year after. Ahok’s decision to 
jump to a political party leads this movement 
as Tetap Ahok.
The last manoeuver of Ahok was leaving 
the independent path and jumping on a 
political party bandwagon at the end of July 
2016. Towards the candidate registration 
period, Ahok received political parties’ support, 
including from the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the Golkar Party, 
the People Conscience Party (Hanura) and 
the National Democratic Party (Nasdem). 
Ahok emphasizes that his volunteers at 
Teman Ahok have agreed with and support 
his decision. 
Ahok’s political manoeuvers have always 
been controversial. His steps of being an 
independent governor, having a clash with the 
City Council on the budget draft and prioritizing 
an independent path in gubernatorial elections 
certainly have ‘shaken’ the country’s political 
establishment. The voluntarism of Teman 
Ahok to some extent shows Ahok’s strategy to 
demonstrate his mass support to the political 
parties. The decentralization in reformasi has 
further enhanced oligarchy in Indonesia, with 
local and national politicians cooperating with 
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bureaucrats and business, to implement as 
well as manipulate policies and laws to their 
needs (Hadiz, 2010 and Berenschot, Nordholt 
& Bakker, 2016). Ahok’s manoeuvers certainly 
brought ‘trouble’ to those oligarchic national 
political elites. Just like Bersih in Malaysia 
(Lim, 2016), these manoeuvers encourage 
the public, particularly the youth in Teman 
Ahok, to engage in wide civic politics.
Political Contest for the Upcoming 
Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial Elections
At the beginning of 2016, Ahok was 
topping the electability survey for Jakarta’s 
2017 Gubernatorial Elections. From the 
poll conducted by the Indonesia Survey 
Institute (LSI) for example, on March 2016 
his electability reached 59.3% leaving other 
candidates behind (Tempo, 21-27 November 
2016: 34-35). As reported by Tempo, his 
electability decreased slightly to 49.1% when 
he decided to jump on the political party 
bandwagon at the end of July 2016. In fact, 
Ahok enjoyed a comfortable gap in most 
surveys until he registered as gubernatorial 
candidate with Djarot Saiful Hidayat as his 
running mate.
The political contestation heated up at the 
end of September 2016 because of Ahok’s 
controversial blasphemy case. The case 
began when Ahok delivered a speech during 
a visit to the Kepulauan Seribu Regency citing 
Surah al-Maidah, verse 51 of the Quran. It 
states that Muslims should not vote for non-
Muslims as leaders. A short clip portraying 
Ahok as joking and telling the locals not to be 
lied to by political leaders using that surah went 
viral after it was edited and a comment added. 
Alas, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) 
considers it to be blasphemy and has urged 
the police to handle this case. Furthermore, 
the hard-line group, Islamic Defenders Front 
(FPI) has filed a complaint against Ahok with 
the police. 
Protest and support abounded in response 
to Ahok’s blasphemy. Spearheaded by the FPI 
leader, Habib Rizieq, the National Movement 
to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council’s 
Fatwa (GNPF MUI) organized three rallies 
to demand the arrest of Ahok. The rallies on 
14 October, 4 November and 2 December 
consecutively aimed to urge the police to 
investigate, prosecute and incarcerate Ahok. 
During the movement, people wearing white 
flocked downtown. The second rally even 
ended with a riot. The movement abated when 
the National Police Criminal Investigation 
Department named Ahok a suspect in a 
blasphemy case on 16 November. Meanwhile, 
Ahok’s adherents held a Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika parade, citing the national motto meaning 
         Source: www.thejakartapost.com 
Picture 3 The 4th November Rally against Ahok’s Blasphemy
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unity in diversity, on 19 November and 4 
December. Rather than supporting Ahok 
explicitly, the goal of this parade was to call 
on the nation to maintain unity amidst recent 
tensions. People wearing red and white clothes 
and traditional attire gathered around Thamrin 
Boulevard to hold interfaith prayers as well as 
music and traditional performances. Not only 
in the offline space, particularly in the city of 
Jakarta, but also the online space has violent 
tension broken out. The widespread use of 
social media enables people to distribute hate 
speeches as shown in the following Table. 
On 24 October, the Jakarta General 
Elections Commission (KPU) determined 
the serial numbers for the three pairs of 
candidates running for the Jakarta 2017 
Gubernatorial Elections. The serial numbers 
of 1, 2 and 3 were obtained consecutively by 
Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono-Sylviana Murni, 
Basuki ‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama-Djarot Saiful 
Hidayat and Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno. 
While Agus-Sylviana has political support 
from the Cikeas Coalition consisting of the 
Democratic Party, the National Mandate Party 
(PAN), the United Development Party (PPP) 
and the National Awakening Party (PKB), 
Anies-Sandiaga receives it from Gerindra 
and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The 
next Jakarta Gubernatorial Elections between 
those three pairs reflects national political 
contestation with three main patrons, namely 
the preceding President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) (Cikeas Coalition), a 
previous President Megawati Soekarno Putri 
(PDI-P) and the losing presidential candidate 
Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra).
Regardless of Ahok’s blasphemy case, 
the events show the increasingly heated 
political contestation for the next Jakarta 
Table 4 Examples of Hate Speech on #DoaUntukAhok (#Pray for Ahok)
Anti-Ahok Pro-Ahok
nahhh kalo alesan dia gusur karna itu bukan 
tanah milik warga, ngapain si ahok ngoceh 
comberan tentang ayat dari kitab suci yang 
bukan “milik dia” yg dalam hal ini enggak dia 
imani?!!! Lu tuh yg bego!!! Hahaha bego lu!!!
[If Ahok evicted the people living not on 
their lands, then why he delivered wanton 
speech using Quran that is not belong to 
him? Such an idiot!!! …]
Ngoceh comberan? Lo bs gak belajar 
bahasa indonesia yg baik dan benar dlu. 
Ngomong aja kyk org gak sekolah mau 
komentarin org lain. Manusia tolol kyk lo 
ini ni yg hrs nya musnah dr ina. Perusak 
moral dan penghasut tnpa tau apa2. Alias 
tong kosong, gunain dlu hidup lo bt org 
lain deh.. berguna jg enggak lu
[Delivered wanton speech? Can you speak 
Bahasa Indonesia in good and right ways? 
You speak as if you aren’t educated, but 
deserve to criticize others. Such stupid 
person like you should be annihilated 
from Indonesia. You are moral destroyer 
and provoker. …]
Haha emang nya anda tau saya demo 
atau tidak demo nya?? Lebih baik saya 
demo walaupun berkata seperti demikian. 
Setidaknya allah liat perjuangan kita 
bahwasanya kami ini ada pergerakan ketika 
islam di injak2. Dari pada anda yg tidak demo 
sok ikut komentar. Dasar cina kafir !
[… At least Allah saw my struggle in 
defending Islam. In fact, you didn’t join the 
rally and only commented. Such an infidel 
Chinese.]
Kalian mengatakan kami kafir, kalian 
mengais rejeki dari kami, memakai barang 
pun made in china semua, agan tidak 
malu dgn perkataan anda, bisa diliat anda 
pendidikan rendah, makan ciki dl gan
[You named us as infidel. You work for us. 
You use made in China products. Don’t 
you feel ashamed with your words? It 
seems that you are low-educated one. 
…. ]
Source: Compiled by the authors from Instagram of temanahokofficial.
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Gubernatorial Elections. The contestation not 
only involves political patrons, but also the 
militant grassroots. This certainly supports 
the argument of Berenscholt, Nordholt 
and Bakker (2016) on the dominance of 
oligarchic elites and patronage politics in 
the democratization of Southeast Asia, 
including Indonesia. However, we believe 
that migration and ethnicities transforming 
Jakarta into a cosmopolitan city will also 
contribute to enhance the deepening civic 
politics of Jakartans. The recent movements 
and debate in the civic space, both offline and 
online, between hard-line Muslims, moderate 
Muslims and other pluralist groups provide 
great opportunities for most Indonesians, 
especially Jakartans, to learn and participate 
in various forms of civic politics. 
Conclusion: Civic or Sectarian Politics?
The story of Jakarta provides an example 
of the ways migration and ethnicities influence 
local politics, both in political discourse and 
in political systems. Rather than glorifying 
the widespread use of social media in recent 
political life, we believe the current political 
developments are a result of many factors 
along the historical processes. The fact of 
Jakarta as a ‘host city’ of migrants since the 
colonial time and even after independence 
has created a multi-ethnic city with a 
relatively plural identity. While the Old Order 
introduced diversity and the New Order 
forced a military line in terms of Jakarta’s 
leadership, the democratic atmosphere of 
recent local politics encourages more plurality 
and multiculturalism. Thus, for the first time 
in history, a Christian Chinese-Indonesian is 
standing in the Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial 
Elections.
The political discourse in the recent 
Jakarta local politics highlights conservatism 
versus pluralism as the core of heated 
discursive debate. The conservatism, which 
is mostly from hard-line Muslim groups, 
sees the texts as direct messages from God 
and demands Islamic purification. These 
scripturalist networks are becoming popular 
and control religious institutions, such as 
mosques, schools and even the Indonesian 
Ulema Council (MUI) (Kloos & Berenschot, 
2016). Meanwhile, the advocates of pluralism 
are the minority migrants, including Christians 
and Chinese-Indonesians, as well as 
moderate Muslims. The moderate Muslims 
or substantialists argue for a more flexible 
interpretation according to modern needs and 
circumstances (Kloos & Berenschot, 2017), 
including voting for non-Muslim leaders. The 
widespread use of social media speeds up the 
distribution of hate speech among them and 
speech may actually reflect the underlying 
problem of inequality in economic distribution 
as well as the stratification gap of different 
social classes within Indonesian society.
Concurrently, migration and ethnicities 
have brought changes to the political 
landscape of Jakarta. For the first time, there 
is public engagement in political movements 
to support their candidate in the next 
gubernatorial elections on an independent 
path with no political party affiliations. While 
the young people are mostly assumed to 
be disconnected from traditional electoral 
politics (Bennett, et.al., 2009; Levine, 2007; 
Zukin, et.al., 2006 in Lim, 2016), Teman Ahok 
narrates a contradictory story. The young do 
not hate politics. They are willing to participate 
in the ‘white’ political practices, which they 
describe as clean and relatively free from the 
oligarchic elites, including political parties, 
therefore, they struggle to collect support 
for their independent candidate. Rather than 
focusing on narrow identity, they put plurality 
and socio-economic welfare issues at the top. 
Overall, these provide space for all 
Jakartans to comprehend their citizenship 
and the civic political culture. Migration 
and ethnicities have transformed Jakarta 
into a cosmopolitan city and brought deep 
consequences to the dynamics of local 
politics. Will civic politics gain victory in a 
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proliferating migrant city, like Jakarta? This 
remains questionable as the gubernatorial 
elections will be held on 15 February 2017 
and the time of Ahok’s blasphemy case has 
not been decided yet by the court. Surely, 
these are great tests for the plurality of 
Jakarta, particularly in terms of ethnicities and 
religions, as well as the government in terms 
of economic redistribution among Jakartans. 
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